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The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on
Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part III)*
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY**
"Laws should humor habits so long as they are not vices" *
Following the three substantive meetings of the UNCITRAL Work-
ing Group in 1972-1973 which reformulated and up-dated the 1924
Hague Rules there was a one year hiatus before the work resumed. In
February, 1974, a special three weeks meeting was held, and in October,
1974 and February, 1975 two weeks sessions were held to complete
preliminary consideration of all issues suggested by the Working Group.
Preparation for the February, 1974 meeting was extensive, with a new
questionnaire and further studies prepared by the UNCITRAL
Secretariat." 7 In the meanwhile the UNCITRAL Commission had
decided that the activities of the Working Group on Merchant Shipping
were to have the highest priority.13 8
Perhaps an explanation for the difficulties, apparent later in this
article, which the Working Group had in the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth
Sessions, can be sought in the fact that in large part the work was now
directed at subjects not contained in the 1924 Hague Rules on Ocean
Bills of Lading. This meant that the Working Group had to confront
* This is the third of four parts of the study of the new draft convention. The first part appeared in
7 J. Mar. L. & Comm. 69-125 (1975) and the second part in 7 J. Mar. L. & Comm. 327-350 (1976).
** Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, Member of the Editorial Board,
United States Representative to the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Sessions of
the UNCITRAL Working Group, and the January, 1976 Session of the UNCTAD Working Group
on International Shipping Legislation. The author is grateful for the assistance of his students,
Michael J. Egelhof and Thomas J. Hawley of the class of 1975, Fordham Law School.
*** Quotation ascribed to the codifiers of the French Civil Code (1804) in Amos & Walton, In-
troduction to French Law 32 (1973), quoted from P. Fenet I Recueil Complet des Travaux Prepar-
atoires du Code Civil, 481 (1830).
'3 Replies to the Third Questionnaire on Bills of Lading Submitted by Governments and In-
ternational Organizations, A/CN.9/WG. III/L.2 Add. I and 2 of I 1 January 1974; Third Report
of the Secretary General on Responsibility of Ocean Carriers for Cargo: Bills of Lading A/CN.9/
88 Add. 1; Report of the Working Group on the Work of its Sixth Session, A/CN.9/88 of 29
March 1974.
131 Commission Decision of May 17, 1974. UNCITRAL Y.B.23 (1974).
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practical issues which were handled in a variety of different ways in
business practice. The different legal systems also had not produced
coherent solutions which reflected a common law or socialist or civil law
point of view. The absence of an historical body of law and practice,
against which the issues could be framed, magnified the divergent
treatments so that it proved to be very difficult for the science of
comparative law to produce a rational harmonization which could gain
the support of a majority of the member states, let alone a consensus.
In many areas the opposing views were stated, on the one side by those
who desired to see the draft convention become a complete maritime law
code governing all the relationships between shippers, carriers and
consignees and on the other side by those who wished to restrict the new
convention to the problems closely associated with the traditional
problems of the Hague Rules.
J. Delay
At the outset it was obvious that there were no specific provisions on
the problems of damages incurred by the cargo owning interest by reason
of delay in delivery of the cargo. There was a considerable body of belief
that when delay caused physical deterioration of the cargo the carrier
would be liable for this damage in the same manner as if the damage
were due to negligent stowage or an unseaworthy condition, 13 9 but the
rationale supporting such liability varied.
Prior to the partial codification of the law on carriage of goods by sea
in the Harter Act of 1893 the carrier was held liable for physical damage
to cargo caused by delay. The legal doctrine frequently used to justify
this liability was the doctrine of deviation, so that the carrier became
liable for loss caused by delays in the beginning of the voyage and during
the continuation thereof. This liability for deviation could not be excused
by exculpatory clauses in the bill of lading since the bill of lading itself
was ousted by the deviation. 140
In many legal systems, however, the issue in delay cases concerned
139S.S. Willdomino v. Citro Chemical Co., 272 U.S. 718 (1927). See also The Caledonia, 157
U.S. 124 (1895) where the Surpreme Court held the carrier liable for physical deterioration of live
animals (cattle) caused by a short supply of food for them due to delay of the voyage by the
unseaworthiness of the ship.
140 When the goods have been damaged physically by decay, rot or other types of deterioration by
reason of delays in the voyage or the commencement of the voyage, the shipper can state a prima
facie case for carrier liability and the carrier must then attempt to prove one of the defenses in
COGSA 1304. Recovery for physical damage has long been upheld. SS Willdomino v. Citro
Chemical Co., 272 U.S. 718 (1927. See also The Citta di Messina, 169 F. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); The
le de Sumatra, 286 F. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); U.S.S.B. v. Texas Star Flour Mills, 12 F.2d9 (5th
Circ. 1926); The Hermosa, 57 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1932); Romano v. West Indies Fruit & SS Co., 151
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the validity of a broadly drawn "LIBERTIES" clause exculpating the
carrier from liability due to carrier delays in loading, moving or
unloading the cargo. 141 The United States approach to delay damages
through a form of deviation could not continue after adoption of the
Hague Rules, since those rules did regulate reasonable deviations,
although the subject of delay remained unregulated.142
Many delegations expected from the outset that the Working Group
would quickly develop principles to deal with physical damages caused
by delay but it was anticipated that there would be difficulty in applying
the same principles to economic losses caused by delay.
In tort law the public policy which permits the recovery of loss of
money alone or loss of profits alone or of market value alone in cases of
intentional tort (those actions arising out of the Writ of Trespass), deceit,
defamation and interference with contract or prospective advantage, is
not present in cases of negligent damage. 143
In contract law the courts have been guided by the principle from
English common law that pecuniary loss from breach of contract may
not be recovered unless such consequences are foreseen by the defendant
before or at the time of contracting. 144 Recovery of pecuniary loss
F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1945); Wayne v. Inland Water Ways Corp., 92 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Ill. 1950);
General Foods Corp. v. U.S., 104 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Norjac Trading Corp. v. The
Mathilda Thorden, 173 F.Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Karobi Lumber Co. v. SS Norco, 249 F.
Supp. 324 (S.D. Ala. 1966).
4'The point at issue in delay cases before and after the Harter Act was the validity of "liberties"
clauses exculpating the carrier from liability to the shipper owing to delays from various types of
incidents. Two grounds of attack have been employed successfully against clauses exculpating the
carrier from delay damage: (I) Construing the clause so as not to apply to the case at all as in
Florida Grain & Elevator Co. v. U.S.S.B., 3 F.2d 314 (S.D. Fla. 1924); The Hermosa, 57 F.2d 20
(9th Cir. 1932); (2) avoiding the clause because ousted by deviation. General Hide & Skin v. U.S.,
24 F.2d 736 (E.D.N.Y. 1928); Kemsley Milbourn & Co. Ltd. v. U.S., 19 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1927).
112 Since enactment of COGSA in 1936, the problem has become whether delay was simply
deviation which thereafter had to be an unreasonable deviation in order to justify any liability,
the liability itself being limited to the $500 Per Package amount of COGSA 1304 (5). At the present
time there is a difference of opinion between the circuits on the inapplicability of COGSA. In
Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Poseidon Schiffahrt, 313 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1963) the court found an
unreasonable deviation but limited the amount of recovery to the Package Doctrine limit. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, has indicated that the type deviation caused by on-deck
stowage of cargo not designated as such will oust the bill of lading so as to deny the carrier the
protection of the $500 limit. Encyclopedia Britannica. Inc. v. SS Hong Kong Producer. 422 F.2d
(2d Cir. 1969).
143 Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); Trans World Airlines Inc. v.
Curtiss- Wright Corp., I Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S. 2d 284 (1955). At best this is a doctrine not based
onthe inherent requirements of the risk theory of negligence, but rather it is a policy choice to limit
the liability of defendants in cases where the proof is likely to be inconclusive or perjured.
14 Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1845). This leading case on damages for
breach of contract states that the aggrieved party may recover such damages as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as
the probable result of the breach of it. For a full discussion of the problems of foreseeable damages
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damage therefore involves questions of fact whether the carrier has
knowledge or is put on notice of special needs of the shipper so that loss
to the shipper would be foreseeable if the cargo is delayed.
Accordingly, some martime courts have denied recovery for pecuniary
loss caused by delay. 45
The approach taken by the Secretary General's Preliminary Report'46
was that the language of Article III (2) of the Hague Rules authorized
recovery for physical damages caused by delay because of the carrier's
obligation to, " . . . properly and carefully load . . . , carry . . . , and
discharge the goods carried." 147 Thereafter, the Report pointed out the
numerous difficulties associated with economic or pecuniary loss as a
result of delay, but concludes that recovery of economic loss is also
authorized under the Hague Rules because it is a loss "in relation to the
• . . carriage. . . and discharge of such goods... "148 Accordingly, the
Report contained a Draft Proposal (A) specifically refraining the carrier
liability general provision to include "loss or damage resulting from
delay in the delivery of goods," a Draft Proposal (B) defining delay and
then offered two solutions respecting the problem of unit limitation of
liability: Draft Proposal (C) which would apply the same amount of
limited liability to all types of delay damages and physical damages to
in contract see J. Calamari and J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts, 329-334 (1970).
115 U.S.S.B. v. Pensacola Lumber & Timber Co., 290 Fed. 358 (5th Cir. 1923); A/S Stavangeren
v. Hubbard Zemurray SS Co., 250 Fed. 67 (5th Cir. 1918). In the latter case the court said:
"The damages resulting by reason of the existence of such special circumstances, of which
the party sought to be charged was not made aware, are disallowed, not because they are
merely consequential or remote, but because they cannot fairly be considered as having been
within he contemplation of the parties at the time of entering into the contract." (250 F.2d
70)
However, see General Hide & Skin Corp. v. U.S. 24 F.2d 736 (E.D.N.Y. 1928) for a recovery of
decline in market value accompanying physical damage occuring through other causes. Further,
there is language in Commercio Transito Internazionale Ltd. v. Lykes Bros. SS. Co., 243 F.2d 683
(2d Cir. 1957) from which it can be argued that there is a cause of action for loss of market due to
delay. This case turned on the question of the application of the one-year statute of limitations of
COGSA 1303 (4). In computing damages in action for delay by the shipper against the carrier, loss
of use and mental anguish have been excluded. See Santiago v. Sealand Co. 366 F. Supp. 1309
(D.P.R. 1974). See also Mahmood Aljassin v. SS South Star, 1971 A.M.C. 1703.
It should be noted that in land carriage in the United States the carrier is liable for both physical
damage and economic loss due to delay, under both the common law and the Carmack Amendment.
See Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. v. Atchison, Tokepa & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 333 F2d (5th Cir. 1961)
Cert. Denied 379 U.S. 967. An extensive annotation on this subject is contained in 13 Am. Jur. 2d
850. See also Adamastos Shipping Co. v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. (1959) A.C. 133.
... A/CN.9/WG. III/WP.12 (Vol. I) of 30 November 1973.
:47 Id. paras 4-5.
1 Id. See also Report of the Working Group A/CN.9/88 of 29 March 1974 at paras. 13-17.
Support was also provided by specific provisions of the Warsaw Convention, Art. 19; the C.M.R.
Convention, Art. 17 (1) and the C.I.M. Convention, Art. 27 (1), all of which make specific provision
for carrier liability for damage occasioned by delay.
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cargo and Draft Proposal (D) which would apply a lesser amount of
limited liability for economic loss, based on a multiple of the freight
charged by the carrier. Lastly there was a complex Draft Proposal (E)
respecting presumption of total loss and intricate procedures occasioned
by a discovery of the missing cargo after expiration of the presumptive
loss period.
The initial discussion of the subject produced unanimous approval for
a clear statement of carrier liability for delay damages, nevertheless
there were sufficient differences of approach, especially concerning the
concept of economic loss, so that the subject was referred to the Drafting
Party to arrive at a single text. At this early stage it was also decided that
the draft convention should not cover the carrier's failure to take the
goods in charge at all. 149 Thus, the delay provision would begin with the
act of the carrier in taking the goods in charge.
Another matter which was raised early in the discussion was the
question of the differing concepts of the measure of damages in national
legal systems. All legal systems recognize that some losses which are
clearly traceable to the defendant's fault can not be recoverable because
too remote. However, when it comes to drawing lines to include or
exclude items of damage, the results differed greatly. For example, in
common law countries there was a split between English and American
courts as to whether the successful party to a law suit could include the
fees charged by his lawyers in the amount of recoverable costs.150
Professor Honnold quickly pointed out the difficulties which the
codifiers of international sales law experienced in U.L.I.S.15 1 when an
attempt was made to draft rules on measure of damages and foreseeabil-
ity.
France believed that the best solution would be to state the rule
creating liability in the most general terms since national law would
certainly exclude indirect or remote or unforeseeable damages.
The United States proposed to amend Draft Proposal A,' 5 2 as follows,
149 In United States law there is no maritime lien for shippers because of the carrier's failure to
load goods. See generally Osaka Shosen Kaisha v. Pacific Export Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 490 (1923).
Thus the action for breach of contract is a civil action under state law, although there has been an
expansion of quasi contract relief in Admiralty. See Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Dimon S.S. Corp.,
290 U.S. 117 (1933)
5I United States Admiralty law, similar to general common law principles, does not permit the
winning party to add his lawyers' fees to the taxable costs to be recovered from the losing party.
The Baltimore 75 U.S. 377 (1869), see also Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
"I' The Uniform Law on International Sale of Goods, THE Hague, July 1, 1964. 1 Register of
Texts of Conventions and Other Instruments Concerning International Trade Law, 39 (1971).
152 Draft Proposal A
"The carrier shall be liable for all loss of or damage in relation to the goods carried if the
occurrence which caused the loss or damage took place while the goods were in his charge as
Hague Rules 491April 1976
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"The carrier shall be liable for all loss or damage respecting goods if the
occurrence which caused the loss or damage took place while the goods
were in his charge, as defined in article [ ], and for economic losses
resulting from delay in the delivery of goods in his charge, unless the
carrier proves that he, his servants and agents took all measures that could
reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence or delay and its conse-
quences."
It was the intent of the United States proposal to indicate in the
substantive law creating carrier liability that mere economic losses would
be treated differently from physical damage to goods, and that there
should be a different and lower level of unit limitation of liability for such
losses.
France, however, disapproved of the "economic loss" language, and
pointed out that it would be impossible to achieve agreement on a
definition of economic loss. The United States, however, indicated that it
might be better not to attempt to define economic loss at all. The
Chairman (Egypt) indicated that if the term "economic loss" were to be
used it would have to be defined.
India agreed that there was a clear distinction between physical
damage and economic loss and that the two should be dealt with
separately.
Ghana introduced the problem of whether "economic loss" would be
of a financial nature only or whether claims for moral damages 153 would
also be included. The United Kingdom agreed and felt that there should
be no reference to economic loss since all loss was financial in nature,
whether arising from physical damage or some consequential losses.
Norway preferred Draft Proposal A because it distinguished only
between physical loss and all other types of losses, and that it would be
appropriate at a later stage to make some different arrangement for unit
limitation of types of losses other than physical damage.
With these expressed differences unresolved, the entire question was
handed over to the Drafting Party along with two versions of a definition
of delay. While Australia, Ghana, United Kingdom, Singapore and
France preferred Draft Proposal B, defining delay154, Norway, Brazil
defined in Article ( ), and for loss or damage resulting from delay in the delivery of
goods subject to a contract of carriage, as defined in Article ( ), unless the carrier
proves that he, his servants, and agents took all measures that could reasonably by required
to avoid the occurrence or delay and its consequences."
5 3
"'Moral damages" are known to civil law-trained lawyers as the concept justifying
non-material damages such as pain and suffering and survivors' grief together with other
non-material losses such as shame and humiliation and loss of reputation. See Amos & Walton,
Introduction to French Law, 209-10 (1973).
I54 Draft Proposal B
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and Poland had preferred the language of article 19 of C.M.R., 155
accordingly, the two texts were referred to the Drafting Party to
consolidate a definition which restated the rule in Hadley v.
Baxendale.1 -5 6
The Drafting Party text accepted Draft Proposals A and B in
simplified form, and these texts are now incorporated in Article 5 (1) and
(2) of the draft convention.
The carrier shall be liable for loss of or damage to the goods, as well as
from delay in delivery if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage
or delay took place while the goods were in his charge as defined in Article( ), unless the carrier proves that he, his servants and agents took all
measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and
its consequences.
Delay in delivery occurs when the goods have not been delivered
within the time expressly agreed upon in writing or, in the absence of such
agreement, within the time which, having regard to the circumstances of
the case, would be reasonable to require of a diligent carrier."
At the Second Reading Art 5(1) was modified to express three types of
damages resulting from breach of the carrier's duty: loss, damage or
expense. It was the intention that the word expense include the
consequential losses to the carrier, whether from destruction, damage or
delay. Also, the Second Reading inserted the requirement of a port of
discharge named in the contract of carriage as a prerequisite for delay
damages.
There was a difference of opinion as to whether the same monetary
limit should apply to both physical damage and non-physical damage
resulting from delay, many delegates, including the U.S., favoring a dual
method of unit limitation with a different and lower limit for economic
loss. 17
Alternative texts were included because of the argument that Govern-
ments would not be in a position to choose between the two approaches
"Delay in delivery occurs- when the carrier does not deliver the goods in accordance with
Article ( ) by the date for delivery expressly agreed upon by the parties or, in the
absence of such agreement, by the latest date that may normally be required for delivery by a
diligent carrier having regard for the circumstances of the case."
"'
5 Art. 19 C.M.R.
"Delay in delivery shall be said to occur when the goods have not been delivered within the
agreed time limit or when, failing an agreed time limit, the actual duration of the carriage
having regard to the circumstances of the case and in particular, in the case of partial loads,
the time required for making up a complete load in the normal way, exceeds the time it would
be reasonable to allow a diligent carrier."
156 See fn. 144 supra.
"' Report of the Seventh Session (A/CN.9/88) at para. 21
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until the amount of unit limitation were chosen. The United States
suggested that the special limitation of liability for delays should also
have alternative texts: one incorporating the freight limitation (strongly
favored by France) and the other based on per package or per weight
limitation. 158 These alternatives are now found in Article 6 of the new
draft convention.
The concept of presumed non-delivery in Draft Proposal E was
approved. After a specified period of delay in delivery the consignee
would be entitled to treat the goods as lost and make a claim against the
carrier on that basis, 159 but, there were differing views as to whether the
carrier should have the right to prove that the goods were not in fact lost.
Some favored retention of the language "unless the carrier proves the
contrary" following the expression "may treat the goods as lost," in
order to permit the carrier to prove that the goods were not lost, and
thereby overcome the presumption of their loss.'
A majority considered it unnecessary to include provisions regulating
in detail the rights of the claimant and the carrier if the goods should be
recovered, trusting that the problems would be solved in commercial
practice.' 6 ' Other representatives urged a complete treatment and
considered that such provisions would be needed in cases where the
consignee wanted to have the goods in spite of the delay because of their
special usefulness to him. The same delegations also thought it was
necessary to protect the consignees' interest in cases when the value of
the goods recovered was in excess of the maximum carrier liability since
in such a case the carrier would receive a windfall profit. Because of
insufficient interest in the details of this complex problem, not much of
the draft language was adopted. Three states had favored the detailed
provisions, while eight were opposed.
K. Documentary and Geographic Scope of the Convention
Although the Second Reading combined these two subjects into a
single article, 2, of the draft convention, nervertheless the problems of
geographic scope and documentary scope had been considered separately
and were separately drafted.
158 Id. at para. 23. There was some objection to the use of a multiple of the freight rate because
there is usually no relation between value of the goods and the freight rate.
159 Id. at para. 24.
160 Id. at para 28 (a).
161 Id. at para 25. There was criticism of the Draft Proposal E as too bureaucratic and inefficient.
A similar provision in CMR had produced no case law.
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1. Documentary Scope
This proved to be an extremely controversial subject, not so much
because of what was to be included in the Convention, but rather because
of what was to be excluded.
The Hague Rules had been prepared at a time when international
trade involving ocean transport was financed solely through documen-
tary credits, a method of procedure which began in the nineteenth
century and reached its greatest development in the middle years of the
twentieth. 162 The relevant documentary scope of the Hague Rules is
found in Article 1 (b) limiting the applicability to the contract of carriage
covered by a bill of lading or to bills of lading issued under a charter
party but negotiated to a third party. The Working Group had already
agreed that the coverage of the Convention must be expanded beyond the
"tackle to tackle" period and a further expansion of the coverage of the
Convention to the various types of informal documents now found in
maritime transport seemed to be necessary. Further, with respect to
those shipments for which no actual documentation was issued because
the shipment was recorded and tracked through computers, the present
documentation requirement is an unnecessary complication. 163 The
revelation of the possibility of an eventual elimination of documentation
brought strong disapproval from Latin American delegates, especially
Argentina. These delegates were suspicious of anything which would
weaken the traditional bill of lading as the principle documentation in
ocean transport.
The United States was concerned about a problem which was not
raised by the Secretariat, the problem of common carriage documented
as private carriage. Such common carriage under charter parties
involved an abuse of the charter party exceptions in Article V and I (b) of
the Hague Rules. 164 In Jefferson Chemical Co. v. MIT Grena,6 5 the
...The subject of documentary credits is well covered in a number of the articles: McCurdy,
Commercial Letters of Credit, 35 Harv. L. Rev 539 (1922); Harfield, Secondary Uses of
Commercial Credit, 44 Colum. L. Rev. 899 (1944); Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of the
Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 251 (1972); Mentschikoff, How to Handle Letters of Credit, 19 Bus.
Law 107 (1963); see also W. Ward and H. Harfield, Bank Credits and Acceptances (4th ed. 1958).
The principal source of law and practice in this area is "The Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits" revised 1974, published by the International Chamber of Commerce. ICC
Pub. No. 290.
163 Report of the Seventh Session (A/CN.9/88) at paras. 37-38.
"'See generally Chiang, The Characterization of a Vessel as a Common or Private Carrier, 48
Tul. L.R. 299 (1974).
16 413 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1969).
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court, after examining the nature of the carrier operations and extent of
vessel use by the shipper under a charter party, found that the carrier was
actually providing common carriage and subjected the transaction to the
terms of COGSA, thereby invalidating exculpatory clauses which would
have been valid in private carriage under charter party.
The United States believed that the scope of the revised convention
should be "carriage of goods" rather than carriage of goods by sea or
bills of lading or contracts of carriage, so as to permit maximum
utilization of the rules. Nevertheless, a carefully phrased exception for
true private carriage under charter parties should be retained. Language
to accomplish these changes was proposed by the United States, as
follows:
"1. The provisions of this Convention shall apply to the carriage of
goods (between ports in two different states).
2. Carriage of goods within the meaning of this Convention does not
include carriage under charter whereby the entire carrying capacity ("the
whole reach of the vessel") or a very substantial portion of such capacity is
employed for a stated period of time (time charter) or for a particular
voyage or voyages (voyage charter). Nevertheless, this Covention shall
apply to the carriage of goods when the vessel is under charter from the
moment at which a bill of lading or document is issued under or pursuant
to a charter regulates the relations between a carrier and a holder of the
same.
3. Contracting states may decline to apply the rules of this Convention
where the transit is domestic or does not involve traversing oceans or seas.
4. Contracting states may decline to apply the rules of this Convention if
both the port of loading and the port of discharge are in non-contracting
states."
The Draft Proposals of the Secretariat were in the context of a
definition of the contract of carriage, as follows:
1. "Contract of carriage" applies to all contracts for the carriage of
goods by sea.
Alternative (a)
2. The provisions of this Convention shall not be applicable to
charter-parties, but if bills of lading, consignment notes or other
documents evidencing contracts of carriage of goods are issued in the case
of a ship under a charter-party they shall comply with the terms of this
Convention.
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Alternative (b)
2. The provisions of this Convention shall not be applicable to carriage
under a charter-party whereby a ship or all or the major (a substantial)
portion of the carrying capacity of a ship is engaged for a stated period of
time or for a particular voyage. However, if bills of lading, consignment
notes or other documents evidencing contracts of carriage of goods are
issued in the case of a ship under a charter-party they shall comply with the
terms of this Convention.
In the view of the United States, the proposals of the Secretariat were
not broad enough as to scope, yet too broad as to exceptions.
Furthermore, Article 6 of the Hague Rules represented a potential
method of avoiding the new rules altogether by the device of giving a
receipt only which could never be turned into a bill of lading.
Professor Honnold noted that the Scope of the new Convention should
not be permitted to shrink as less formal means of documenting
international trade were developed. He also recommended retention of
Article 6.
Brazil, Hungary, and India supported the idea that the new convention
should be given the broadest possible scope.
Norway supported the deletion of Article 6, but favored the retention
of the existing structure of Article 1 (b) excluding charter parties and
eventually introduced another exception for long range space require-
ment contracts or quantum contracts which were not charter parties
because no specific ship was in contemplation at the time of
contracting. 166
The I.C.S. representative called for the deletion of Article 6 as
inadequate, but this was immediately rebutted by the United Kingdom
asserting the view that the structure of the rules provide and should
continue to provide mandatory rules for certain types of contracts with
special exceptions for those contracts, such as charters, not within the
reach of the mandatory rules. At least the existing exceptions should be
preserved. These views were supported by Japan.
The United Kingdom presented a Draft Proposal. In response to the
Secretariat Questionnaire, the United Kingdom had suggested the
inapplicability of the Hague Rules to goods of no commercial value or
where experimental forms of packing are used or for very unusual
cargoes. The United Kingdom's proposal together with commentary
thereon was as follows:
166 Report of the Seventh Session (A/CN/9/88) at para. 46.
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"1. These Rules shall apply to all contracts for the carriage of goods by
sea where a bill of lading or similar document of title is issued.
2. These Rules shall apply to all other contracts for the carriage of
goods by sea unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise and a
statement to that effect is endorsed on the document evidencing the
contract of carriage and signed by the shipper.
3. These Rules shall not apply to charter parties."
"It will be seen that this proposal is identical in substance, with one
difference, to that in alternative (a) in the Secretariat proposal. The new
Rules would apply to all contracts of carriage by sea, except charter
parties, whether or not a bill of lading was issued. The only difference lies
in the very special case where both parties agree expressly that the Rules
should not apply, and this agreement is endorsed on the document
evidencing the contract of carriage (which cannot for these cases be a bill
of lading or document of title), and signed by the shipper. Thus there is no
question of these exceptional agreements being contracts of adhesion."
Strong opposition to paragraph 2 of the U. K. proposal came from
Australia and Argentina.
The Norwegian proposal was generated by concern that very broad
language in the Convention would be interpreted by courts to the effect
that all contracts having to do with sea transport must either come under
the Convention or be specifically excluded from it. There could thus, be
no way to avoid the problem with requirements contracts by not
mentioning them in the Convention. Accordingly, Norway introduced a
modification of the Secretariat Proposal,
"For the purpose of this article, contracts for the carriage of a certain
quantity of goods to be shipped consecutively for a specified period of time
shall be deemed to be a charter party."
Norway urged that the Convention provisions defining contract of
carriage should accommodate the most pressing needs: firstly, the bill of
lading, where demanded by the shipper, because of its diverse functions;
Secondly, other types of documents with less functions; Thirdly, the
situations where documentation was minimal: the consignment note or
the use of automatic data processing equipment.
Singapore felt that the scope of the documents within the Convention
should include delivery orders and was concerned with the lacuna in the
law being perpetuated by the charter party exception, such exception
being removed by the negotiation of the bill of lading issued under
charter to a third party.
Germany noted that the real problem would come with the attempt to
define the contract of carriage itself. Although the Hague Rules only set
out to govern bills of lading and not carriage by sea, nevertheless it was
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appropriate now for an extension of the scope of documents beyond bills
of lading.
France explained the provisions of the French Law on Contracts of
Affreightment of June 18, 1966,17 that the entrustment of goods to the
carrier gave rise to the contract. The Convention, in similar fashion,
should apply from the entrustment to the carrier.
Furthermore, France believed that the new Convention should be
totally dissociated from questions of negotiability and title to the bill of
lading, regulating only relations between the shipper interest and the
carrier interest.
The C.M.I observer reformulated proposals for excepting contracts of
carriage with the consent of the parties, as follows:
"The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to contracts giving
the shipper the right to:
I. engage the vessel for a specified period of time.
2. call upon the ship owner to carry a volume of goods over a certain pe-
riod of time.
3. engage the full or a substantial part of the vessel's carrying capacity.
4. give directions with respect to the route, navigation, operation or
management of the ship.
However, the above provisions notwithstanding, the rules of this
Convention shall apply when bills of lading have been issued to evi-
dence the contract of carriage."
The C.M.I observer noted that the tendency to complicate the issuance
of the bill of lading would confirm the trend to ship with informal
documents only rather than bills of lading, and that eventually the carrier
might charge an extra fee for the issuance of a bill of lading.
There followed an extensive debate about the definition of a charter
party, however there was little agreement about the requirements for
such a definition and the attempt was abandoned.
Summarizing the discussion the chairman believed there was consen-
sus that the scope of application of the Convention should be broadened
to be made more widely applicable and that it should apply to "all
contracts of carriage of goods by sea," except charter parties, including
all types of maritime transport, all forms of obligation (contract, tort,
bailment), all documents, and situations when shipments are handled by
117There was considerable difficulty about the change in French terminology since the
expression "charte-partie" used in the 1924 Hague Rules and earlier treatises has been suppressed in
favor of "contrat d' affr~tement" which has a French meaning restricted to private carriage and not
as broad as the English expression "contract of affreightment" which is more nearly synonymous to
the broad expression contract of carriage.
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computers. Under special circumstances, the parties to a contract of
carriage should be permitted specifically to agree to the non-applicability
of the Convention, nevertheless Article 6 of the present Hague Rules
would be dropped. As to charter parties, there was agreement that the
Convention not be applicable, however, the convention will apply to the
contractual relation between the carrier and the cargo owner under a bill
of lading who was not himself the charterer. The exclusion of quantum
contracts from the convention was controversial, but a slight majority
favored it.
The draft provisions on the documentary scope of application of the
convention to replace Article 1 (b) of the Brussels Convention of 1924
were as follows, and are now found in Article 2, modified to include
provisions on geographic scope, and excluding paragraph 4, suppressed
at the Second Reading:
"1. The provisions of the Convention shall be applicable to all
contracts for the carriage of goods by sea.
2. Where a bill of lading or similar document of title is not issued, the
parties may expressly agree that the Convention shall not apply,
provided that document evidencing the contract is issued and a
statement of the stipulation is endorsed on such a document and signed
by the shipper.
3. The provisions of this Convention shall not be applicable to charter
parties. However, where a bill of lading is issued under or pursuant to a
charter party, the provisions of the Convention shall apply to such a bill
of lading where it governs the relation between the carrier and the
holder of the bill of lading.
4. For the purpose of this Article, contracts for the carriage of a
quantity goods over a certain period of time shall be deemed to be
charter parties."
2. Geographic Scope:
Article 10 of the Hague Rules simply states: "The provisions of this
Convention shall apply to all bills of lading issued in any of the
contracting States." By the terms of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act the provisions of the law are not to apply to domestic carriage. 168
The reservation entered by the United States upon ratification of the
Hague Rules requires that the contracting state limitation therein be
ineffective in United States courts.
Despite the greater number of ratifications and adhesions to the
16846 U.S.C. 1300, "...every bill of lading or similar document of title which is evidence of
contract for the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in foreign trade shall
have effect subject to the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis added).
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Hague Rules there has never been universal acceptance. Many nations
have adopted the liability scheme and much of the actual language of the
Hague Rules without becoming contracting states. Furthermore, the
process of ratification may be quite lengthy; accordingly, Article 10
should be deleted from the Revised Rules because of the potential
uncertainty it would introduce.
Article 5 of the Brussels Protocol of 1968 was proposed to meet this
difficulty. However, most delegations in 1974 did not consider it to be
satisfactory since it did not apply the terms of the Convention when the
port of discharge is located in a contracting state.
Article 5 of the unratified Brussels Protocol of 1968 provides for
replacement of Article 10 with the following:
"The provisions of this Convention shall apply to every Bill of Lading
relating to the carriage of goods between ports in two different states if:
a-The Bill of Lading is issued in a contracting state or
b-The carriage is from a port in a contracting state or
c-The contract contained in or evidenced by the Bill of Lading pro-
vides that the rules of this Convention or legislation of any state
giving effect to them are to govern the contract.
Whatever may be the nationality of the ship, the carrier, the shipper, the
consignee, or any other interested person."
"Each contracting state shall apply the provisions of this Convention to
the Bills of Lading mentioned above. This article shall not prevent a
contracting state from applying the Rules of this Convention to Bills of
Lading not included in the preceding paragraphs."
Because the place of issuance of the bill of lading does not bear an
adequate relationship to the performance of the contract of carriage,
and because of constitutional problems in some federal states it seemed
to be unwise for the international convention to mandate its applicability
to domestic waterborne transportation, nevertheless the problem kept re-
curring"'
The many examples of conflicting provisions concerning applicability
seemed to require a complete change of approach from the Hague Rules,
thus the Secretariat prepared two draft proposals:
Draft Proposal A rephrased the awkward formula of Article 5 of the
Brussels Protocol and provided that contracting states were free to apply
the rules of the Convention to bills of lading not included within the
Convention scope.
Draft Proposal B would apply the Convention to every bill of lading
(or contract of carriage) between ports in-two different states if:
"'See. Gen. Rpt. (A/CN.9/WG III/W.P.12) at para. 5.
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(a) the bill of lading document evidencing the contract of carriage is
issued in a contracting state, or,
(b) the port of loading or the port of discharge or one of the optional
ports of discharge provided for in the documents evidencing the con-
tract of carriage is located in a Contracting State, or
(c) the document evidencing the contract of carriage provides that
the provisions of this Convention or the legislation of any State,
giving effect to them are to govern the contract.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 are applicable without regard to the
nationality of the ship, the carrier, the shipper, the consignee or any
other interested person.
Draft Proposal A was supported by Japan and the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom feared that specific reference to the port of
discharge would give support to those states (like the United States and
specifically the Federal Maritime Commission) which would attempt a
unilateral regulation of international trade, accordingly, references to the
loading state were permissible, but the port of discharge should not be
included.
Draft Proposal B was supported by Egypt, Hungary, Singapore,
India, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana, Argentina, Chile, and Australia.
Belgium and the Soviet Union indicated they could support it, however,
the Soviet Union wanted to explore the possibility of special provisions
for regional groupings such as the C.M.E.A.
Australia proposed permissive language to authorize Contracting
States to apply the Convention to domestic transport. Although there
was some initial opposition to this language from France, most
delegations found it to be acceptable. During the Second Hearing there
was more difficulty witli this language, however, because of a Norwegian
proposal, supported by the Soviet Union, to state directly that the
Convention shall apply to domestic transport but that contracting states
would be able to exempt themselves explicity from such provisions. The
United States indicated that this might raise grave constitutional
questions and the Norwegian proposal was dropped.
The Drafting Party proposed the following:
"I. The provisions of this Convention shall, subject to Article (), be
applicable to every contract of carriage of goods by sea between ports in
two different States, if:
(a) the port of loading as provided for in the contract of carriage is
located in a Contracting State, or
(b) the port of discharge as provided for in the contract of carriage is
located in a Contracting State, or
(c) one of the optional ports of discharge provided for in the contract of
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carriage is the actual port of discharge and such port is located in a Con-
tracting State, or
(d) the bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract of
carriage is issued in a Contracting State, or
(e) the bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract of car-
riage provides that the provisions of this Convention or the legislation of
any State giving effect to them are to govern the contract.
"2. The provisions of paragraph 1 are applicable without regard to
nationality of the ship, the carrier, the shipper, the consignee or any other
interested person."
The language of these paragraphs is now incorporated in Article 2 of
the draft convention.

